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In this essay, I argue that an immortal existence could be desirable. Taking the accounts of 
Williams and Smuts under careful consideration, I agree with Fischer that an immortal existence 
could be gratifying. When Fischer argues that it is unfair for Williams to posit that an immortal 
life must have self-exhausting pleasures and, overall, a better experience than mortal life, he gets 
to the crux of the argument for immortality: as long as there are positive categorical desires for 
the individual, then such life-affirming desires will provide an impetus to carry on. In moving 
past the Teiresias model of a phenomenon that retains memories while changing characters, I 
argue that a life of intellectual inquiry – which essentially alters the character of the individual 
while maintaining memories – offers an outward looking existence which provides internal 
pleasures. Accordingly, with the use of technology, computer simulations have the potential to 
provide pleasures and experiences that escape reality. In this sense, technology has the potential 
to supplement an immortal life. We cannot say whether there will be a pinnacle of such learning 
and pleasure which leads to decreasing returns, but it seems plausible that an immortal being 
who incorporates learning and pleasure that could potentially lead to innovation and discovery 
would seek to continue such intellectual inquiry and varied experiences until all learning 















If afforded the opportunity to become immortal, Bernard Williams posits that we should 
not accept the offer. In “The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality,” 
Williams discusses three models of immortality, of which he argues against the desirability of 
each. I argue that Williams makes a strong case against each model, but he not only neglects the 
difference between self-exhausting and repeatable pleasures – as pointed out by John Martin 
Fischer (1994) – but he was unable to foresee the potential of technology to enhance and 
supplement human life. In this essay, I will be arguing for the desirability of the immortality of 
human life, as the arguments both for and against the immortality of any other life form would 
entail such gross speculation that I could not effectively make a case.    
The Case against the Desirability of Immortality 
The scope of Williams’s argument against the desirableness of immortality encompasses 
categorical desires. A categorical desire is a desire that provides an impetus to continue living. In 
this sense, there are both positive categorical desires – which are those that are life-affirming – 
and negative categorical desires – those that supersede life and make death imperative. For 
immortality to be a life-affirming experience, at least one positive categorical desire must be 
present. A contingent desire, such as an enjoyable hobby, would only be a supplement to life, 
and therefore a positive categorical desire must be present in order for an immortal life to be 
fulfilling. If only negative categorical desires are present, then immortality would induce 
anguish. If no categorical desires are present in the individual, then he or she may simply 
experience conditional desires that supplement life, yet do not provide a reason to carry on.  
To understand Williams, we must note that a conditional desire is one that makes life 
more pleasant, such as the enjoyment of one’s favorite food, but the desire only requires that the 
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individual be alive in order to experience the pleasure, rather than providing a goal from which 
to carry on life. In this sense, a categorical desire provides a specific reason for an individual to 
continue life, and therefore the desire essentially makes life worth living. 
When Williams presents us with the story of Elena Makropulos (EM), a subject of a play 
by Karl Capek, we learn that she is age 342, yet has been immortal for the last 300 years. This 
means that EM is perpetually at the physical age of 42, although her memories span the entire 
342 years. Three hundred years ago, she began drinking a life-extending elixir. Yet, Elena’s life 
does indeed end, when she chooses to no longer drink the elixir. The EM model, according to 
Williams, shows that immortality is not desirable because Williams views EM’s plight of 
boredom and coldness as inescapable. EM is cold because while she is immortal, those around 
her are mortal, and therefore she suffers through cycles of birth and death, while she remains 
isolated, objectively viewing her extended life as meaningless. EM’s nihilistic perspective 
reminds us of Thomas Nagel’s (1986) point that loss of conviction is the problem of the meaning 
of life (p. 214). When an individual begins to view herself objectively, then there is the potential 
to realize that her life, in the broad scope of the events of the world, is meaningless. It is not that 
her life has no meaning to herself or those around her, but unless she played a crucial part in the 
shaping of the world, then her never existing would not have had a major impact on the direction 
of the world. 
The second model of immortality that Williams argues against is one of a changing 
character in the same physical body. In this model, the individual does not retain the same 
personality because she does not retain her identity or memory, and therefore she is, essentially, 
born over and over again. This is reminiscent of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, yet the eternal 
recurrence aspect need not apply. In a sense, this character is more similar to that of 
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reincarnation, yet with the same physical body. I agree with Williams that it is not possible for 
such an individual to retain a personal identity when she does not remember her past; she just 
faces coterminous lives in the same body. 
The third model of immortality that Williams argues against is the Teiresias model. This 
model consists of an individual who, like the second model, exists immortally as a series of 
characters, but he is able to retain his memory. In this sense, the individual is living a fantasy (p. 
86) and becomes a “phenomenon” (p. 86), rather than possessing an individual identity. In 
ignoring the connection between the coterminous lives, yet retaining the memory of experience 
of each of the lives, the phenomenon of Teiresias is one of a fantastical nature, and therefore 
difficult to equate to our desires. While Williams considers this model as a possibility worth 
arguing both for and against, I do not see it as realistic enough to argue for. 
The Desirability of Immortality 
The desirability of immortality greatly depends on the surroundings that the individual is 
subjected to. In this sense, one must be free to live as she wishes, and this means that she is at 
liberty to create her own future. Liberty is very important in the desirableness of our current 
mortal life, but it is doubly important to an immortal being. For if I am a slave or political 
prisoner, or if I am a prisoner of a disease-ridden body, then, as a mortal, I will eventually die 
and return to nothingness as my only escape. To be immortally under these negative conditions 
would be horrendous. It seems to me that Williams is partially arguing that in living an eternal 
life, we would become so bored that we would live as prisoners of our own bodies, similar to a 
ghost who might be believed to eternally haunt a location, or the un-living creatures Damiel and 
Cassiel in Wim Wenders’ Wings of Desire (1987), of which Aaron Smuts (2008) states that they 
are “unable to fulfill the truncated set of desires they barely feel.”  
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If a case can be made for the desirableness of immortality, then the affirmation must 
hinge upon the ability to experience new events – or at least, we must think that they are new – 
and, therefore, our categorical desires must continue to be life-affirming throughout eternity. 
Williams argues that the only experiences that could keep us occupied at a level to wish to 
continue living eternally would be those that require great concentration, such as an intellectual 
pursuit. Yet, he continues by stating that “those who totally wish to lose themselves in the 
movement can consistently only hope that the movement will go on…the consistent 
Spinozist…can only hope that the intellectual activity goes on” (p. 90). I take this to mean that 
an immortal being who focuses on intellectual activity is so tied to her studies that they consume 
her, and therefore the situation is less than symbiotic; she becomes a parasite to her studies and 
needs them to carry on. I disagree with Williams on this condition of intellectual activities 
causing the immortal individual to latch on or perish in anguish. It seems possible to entirely 
focus on an activity and project one’s direction outward without losing identity and becoming 
reliant upon the external source. Fischer (1994) argues that it is possible for one to become 
heavily invested in activities to the point of “losing oneself,” while remaining the owner of the 
experiences (p. 352). If the individual has the liberty to create experiences, then she is not 
necessarily reliant upon them. I see no need for intellectual pursuit to become an addiction that 
once ended, results in negative categorical desires. 
Williams argues for the defender of the desirability of immortality to come up with an 
experience that renders boredom to be “unthinkable” (p. 88), and I see no reason for this to be 
the case. In our mortal lives, there is the possibility of boredom, and I can understand that an 
eternity of boredom would be torture, but it seems to me that there could be periods of boredom 
in the immortal life without a definitive loss of positive categorical desires. Fischer argues that a 
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mix of activities could be part of a package in an immortal life (p. 353), and I think that this line 
of thinking gets to the crux of the desirableness of immortality: an individual with the liberty to 
create experiences, combined with the technology to do so, has the potential to become absorbed 
in a life of intellectual pursuit that does not become parasitic to the pursuit. Next, Fischer 
differentiates between self-exhausting pleasures – those which might be pursued once or twice 
and then desire is fulfilled (p. 355) – and repeatable pleasures, which are those that, if spaced out 
accordingly, can provide a continued source of pleasure throughout the life of an immortal 
individual (p. 356). 
While repeatable pleasures provide a source of amusement, they are generally conditional 
desires that do not provide an impetus for living. In this sense, repeatable pleasures might help to 
quell boredom, but they are supplemental to categorical desires. It is understandable that Fischer 
is arguing against Williams’s statement that boredom must be unthinkable for the immortal 
being, but I’m not quite satisfied with repeatable pleasures as providing a foundation of a 
positive immortal experience. Contingent desires are not life-affirming, and therefore positive 
categorical desires are necessary in order for the immortal being to continue living a fulfilled life. 
Yet, if we can show that liberty and technology are harbingers of new categorical desires, then 
repeatable pleasures are the perfect supplement. 
Liberty and technology as harbingers of new categorical desires open doors to further 
insightful possibilities. Smuts (2008) argues that the Teiresias model need not be as fantastical as 
described by Williams. Humans enter stages of developmental progression, passing from 
childhood to adolescence and adulthood, and therefore we possess memories of each stage, yet 
may be a radically different person at any stage. To be sure, we formulate character through our 
experiences and progression, and therefore when we look back at previous stages of life, we may 
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hardly recognize our former selves. I find Smuts’ argument to be insightful, as the liberty of 
proceeding through life as a free, self-actualizing person makes the possibility of owning 
technology and using it as a mode of life-affirming categorical desire creation both attractive and 
realistic. 
Individual versus Group Immortality  
It is important to differentiate between the immortality of one particular being versus that 
of an entire race or group of beings because each has different necessities for desirability. I find 
it less convincing to argue for a group of beings to be immortal and desiring of such, yet it seems 
to me that an individual could desire an immortal life. Smuts (2008) argues that immortality 
“would threaten to deplete our actions of their significance,” and I take this to mean that on a 
singular level, an individual’s actions could become as meaningless as Nagel describes them, but 
on a group level, the entire race faces a tortured nothingness that deadens the personality and 
eliminates categorical desires. 
An immortal individual who is surrounded by mortals faces the same life and death 
cycles of friends and families that we experience, but she would face them on a much greater 
level. Boredom is a possible negative experience of an immortal life, but I think that the 
emotional burden of living around mortals is the major hurdle. Any type of relationship formed 
between immortal and mortal beings is ultimately broken by the death of the mortal. The 
immortal being stands subjected to the miracle of life and the agony of death over and over 
again, all while becoming further and further isolated. At this point, we must consider whether 
the immortal being suffers pain. I see no reason for an immortal being to be immune to pain. In a 
sense, pain and suffering shape us as individuals, and therefore experiencing pain or suffering on 
some level might be a part of the human experience. 
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James Tiptree Jr. imagines the immortal to be a painless being who would be subject to 
biological experiments by mortals because the inability to feel pain would be beneficial to 
mortals. In “Painwise,” the main character is forcefully sent through space, away from Earth, in 
order to have tests run on his mental and physical states. Tiptree has us believe that, for mortals, 
an immortal being would be such an amazing source of information that they would be prepared 
to affect his own liberty for their benefit. Because of this subjugation of the immortal, mortals 
would be willing to subject him to testing in order to learn more about immortality and how 
mortals might benefit from his inability to feel pain. In “Painwise,” the tests, and sense of 
distress, cause the main character to attempt suicide, but his attempts are futile. Eventually, he is 
able to return to Earth, but in doing so, he learns that he has been programmed to only feel pain 
on Earth, which implies that mortals have been able to affect him in a way that would make 
Earth seem to be a forbidden place. Such a situation as experiencing pain on Earth would 
seemingly lead to a willingness of the immortal to continue the tests while benefitting the 
mortals. Yet, the immortal character chooses a death on Earth, as this is his only chance at liberty 
– his negative categorical desire, created by the mortals, comes to fruition. 
The choice of the main character to end his life implies that Tiptree views liberty as a 
categorical desire, and in this case, a negative one. It is only possible for the main character to 
obtain freedom through self destruction, and he chooses to do so rather than living as a 
meaningless immortal. Yet, I argue that his life is meaningless because his situation is one 
whereas he is an object to mortals, and therefore does not truly establish himself as subject. This 
situation of imprisonment is similar to de Beauvoir’s argument that woman behaves as “Other” 
because of a patriarchal culture thrust upon her. In “Painwise,” the main character is thrust into a 
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situation of becoming a specimen of testing, and therefore can only view the future as one of 
restriction, and thus he is reduced to a meaningless life as object of subjugation.  
Borges (1949) wrote a short story titled “The Immortal,” whereas the main character 
becomes immortal by drinking from a magical river, and then finds himself in a City of 
Immortals. Through Borges, we see the possibility, once again, that an immortal life without 
categorical desires could become nothingness. The main character comes to the realization that 
the immortals were “determined to live in thought, pure speculation” (p. 113). In this sense, the 
immortals view physical activities as meaningless, and they live in a world of deep thought that 
separates their existence from reality. This is the condition that Williams alludes to, whereas 
immortals could only become content in losing themselves through an intense focus on a mental 
activity, and he argues that such focus separates the individual from reality. When Fischer argues 
that intense focus need not be a separation of an individual’s thoughts from reality, I agree when 
we come back to the singular level of immortality. A society of immortals has great potential to 
eventually view all activity as meaningless, and therefore, rather than face an attempt at mass 
destruction, it seems plausible that they would immerse themselves in thought. A society of 
immortals would simply have no motivation to carry on. 
Borges describes the city as full of dead-end doors, high windows out of reach, and 
stairways that “would die without leading anywhere” (p. 111). Later, he argues that the 
immortals “knew that in an infinite period of time, all things happen to all men” (p. 114). I take 
this to mean that Borges views immortality as a continuous walk down dead-end pathways and a 
feeling of apathy because every possible situation will occur at least once and therefore the 
immortal has no reason for desires. It would make no sense, to Borges, for an immortal to have 
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initiative, as everything that can happen to a person will occur to an immortal, and therefore 
thought provides the avenue for a mind’s duration. 
It seems to me that a singular immortal would not be stuck in a rut of deep thought 
without passion for anything in life. Earlier I talked about the possibility of an immortal feeling 
pain; I think that pain is a necessity for the singular immortal. Through suffering, the singular 
immortal is able to grow from experiences. Through the pain of watching the life cycles of other 
unfold, combined with intense intellectual study enhanced by technology, it would be possible 
for the suffering of EM to be a growth tool, and combined with the deep thought of the 
immortals in Borges’ story, an individual immortal would have the potential to formulate 
categorical desires.   
Technology and the Desirability of Immortality 
The use of technology has the potential to both boost and destroy human existence. For 
the singular immortal, I argue that a life of autonomy is the only way that life-affirming 
categorical desires can continuously exist. Huxley would have us envision a future of soma-
induced tranquility and Stephenson’s Snow Crash raises the potential of a virus that could wreak 
havoc in a human-created metaverse. Also, Philip K. Dick, in Do Androids Dream of Electric 
Sheep, asks us to question our humanity in a world in which we mix with androids, and Francis 
Fukuyama, in Our Posthuman Future, argues that we should not only proceed with caution into 
posthumanity, but we must acknowledge that our posthuman future has already begun. In a 
sense, these stories are palpable versions of potential dystopia similar to Orwell’s Nineteen 
Eighty-Four, and perhaps an extension of our fears. In order to truly actualize immortality, we 
must consider the future and how it would affect an immortal being who will experience all of 
eternity.    
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As virtual reality becomes more of possibility, already existing in the form of video 
games and internet lifestyles, it seems plausible to consider the affect of Nozick’s experience 
machine on the immortal. An experience machine, or a machine in which the user can enter a 
simulated reality directed toward pleasurable experiences, offers the potential for the immortal to 
create a life – whether temporary or permanent – in which she can experience goals, pleasures 
and desires that may not exist in reality. Smuts (2009) argues that a journey of eternal frustration 
would not be desirable, and that “only those of heroic perseverance or supernatural powers of 
self-deception” (p. 16) would have the will to continue seeking new challenges in a 
“motivationally devastating” immortal life where abilities are fixed. Smuts’s argument is entirely 
rational: in living an immortal life with fixed abilities, an individual would be continuously 
frustrated because she could never surpass certain hurdles, whether they are to grow wings and 
fly to a neighboring planet, or reach the high windows described by Borges or, perhaps 
emotionally, to overcome the strife suffered by EM.  
Interestingly, Smuts argues that immortal individuals with god-like powers would either 
be self-destructive in a manner that causes frustration due to competing goals, or the beings 
would work together cohesively and “accomplish anything that is logically possible” (p. 17). 
Yet, it is this very ability to accomplish anything that Smuts views as ultimately leading to 
insignificance. We should recall Fischer, who argues the difference between self-exhausting and 
repeatable pleasures. While it is true that the immortal would get tired of repeated desires or, in 
this case, accomplishments, I argue that an immortal individual could consistently create new 
challenges and that, spaced out enough, even repetitive challenges could be desirable. However, 
I agree with Smuts that an immortal race or group would, even without fixed abilities, become 
bored with success or counter each other’s powers, resulting in anguish.   
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Virtual realities create an outlet for the mind to enter a simulated world and, similar to 
Poul Anderson’s 1957 science fiction story, “Call Me Joe,” it seems plausible that we will 
ultimately be able to upload our minds into a simulated environment, or an experience machine, 
and then live out fantasies or create challenges in a manner that ignites categorical desires. 
Proponents of mental statism will argue that the mental state of the individual determines value, 
and therefore if our simulated reality machine creates categorical desires within the individual, 
then it is possible that the immortal being could live a continuously fulfilled life. Yet, I include 
the caveat that an immortal individual may not be eternally fulfilled if she is only living in the 
virtual world, or is, perhaps, a brain in a vat. She would require the liberty to leave the virtual 
world at any time, and therefore she would retain the memory of her life in reality upon entering 
the simulation.  
Perhaps it would be effective to erase her memory upon leaving the virtual world, as this 
erasure would consistently bring her back into reality with the memory that she had before 
entering the virtual world. In a sense, if she were to keep returning to reality and then re-entering 
the virtual world to begin another simulation, then she would have a condition similar to 
anterograde amnesia, such as Guy Pearce in the movie Memento. With each return to reality, she 
would begin again as the person she was before she entered the virtual world. Yet, in the virtual 
world, she would have the liberty to return at any time because of her memories. Accordingly, 
our immortal would create new categorical desires if she so chose to advance humankind through 
rigorous study. I consider it plausible that an immortal being who is aware of her immortality 
and the possibility of boredom could become so engulfed in intellectual rigor, mostly through the 
virtual reality, that she would wish to retain her memory through most cases, but she would have 
the liberty to delineate from this method of memory loss if the particular experience was 
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pleasant. For instance, if she were to improve mankind through the curing of a disease of in 
providing understanding of a subject that only her depth of knowledge could resolve, then her 
down time could involve a series of pleasurable experiences in virtual reality sessions until her 
mind recovers from the strain and her body completes replenishment. 
Conclusion 
I have argued that immortality could be desirable if the immortal being is surrounded by 
mortals, rather than other immortals, and if she has fixed abilities. In retaining her liberty, she 
has the freedom to create and act upon her categorical desires, and these desires could be 
supplemented by repeatable pleasures. Our immortal would live two lives: one in the reality that 
we know, and another in a virtual reality. The caveat here is that she may elect to have her 
memory from the simulations erased, and therefore she experiences self-induced anterograde 
amnesia. It would be possible for others to argue that she is not living a fulfilled life because 
generations of mortals are helping her trick herself into believing that some repeated events in 
virtual reality are actually new to her, but if these repeated experiences are valuable to her, then 
we cannot say with certainty that she is not living a fulfilled life.  
It is of primary importance that an immortal individual not obtain negative categorical 
desires, as she will then live a life of anguish. It is also of importance to not allow her to lose all 
desires, or subsequently end up in a mode of thought that is so deep that she escapes reality and 
becomes apathetic to her surroundings. It is in conjunction mortals, not in spite of, that our 
immortal would live a life of fulfillment. If she were to use her extended memories and 
accumulated wealth of knowledge to enhance the human condition, then her success would 
coincide with the success of mortals, and thus produce a symbiotic relationship. 
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I readily acknowledge that a symbiotic relationship between an immortal being and 
mortals could create a situation whereas either party could be in a position to harm the other, but 
it would make little sense for mortals to harm the immortal when she could assist them in living 
longer and better lives, and it would make even less sense for the immortal to harm the only 
contacts that she knows – mortals. While technology might appear to distance humans from one 
another because of the indirect contact, our immortal would be eternally living proof that 
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